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The most important lessons are taught by example.  Children learn the fundamental values that 
guide them throughout their lives from the examples set by their parents, especially their mothers.  
Even before they understand a language, they learn by observing and imitating the actions of their 
parents.   For almost fifty years Roe v Wade guaranteed pregnant women the freedom to determine 
whether to carry their pregnancy to term.  The right to obtain a safe abortion prior to viability is 
the most significant and controversial aspect of this freedom.   The Supreme Court is now poised 
to overturn what it previously described as the central holding of Roe and allow state governments 
to restrict abortions prior to viability.  If this occurs, it will not be because of an erosion of 
precedential authority.  Instead, it will result from decades of concerted efforts to pack the Supreme 
Court with Justices who reject the premise that the substantive due process guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of the states.  Whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
independently restricts the power of states to regulate abortion, however, is not the focus of this 
essay.  Instead, this essay argues that parallel developments in First Amendment law not only 
reinforce the traditional justification for safeguarding a woman’s freedom to determine whether to 
continue the course of a pregnancy, but provides an independent justification for subjecting 
abortion restrictions to heightened judicial scrutiny.  Over the past fifty years, Justices that would 
restrict the Fourteenth Amendment’s role in guaranteeing individual liberty have successfully 
argued for a greater role for the First Amendment.  Government regulation of conduct, especially 
commercial conduct, previously not recognized as protected speech have increasingly been subject 
to heightened judicial scrutiny and, in some cases, categorical protection.  This essay examines 
two recent cases, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm. and Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., in which the Justices were required to consider whether the First Amendment and its 
protection of speech applied to conduct that would not traditionally have been considered speech.  
These cases highlight both the substantive and strategic value of (re)considering the myriad ways 
in which conduct is expressive or otherwise integral to expression and the nature of judicial review.  
When applied to abortion, this line of reasoning illuminates the expressive values at stake with 
pregnancy and childbirth; why abortion restrictions must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that 
they do in fact promote a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of mother and child; and to 
prevent governing majorities from using childbirth to endorse and celebrate moral beliefs that are 











Free Speech & Abortion: 
The First Amendment Case Against Compelled Motherhood 
 
Raymond Shih Ray Ku1
I.  Introduction 
  
The most important lessons are taught by example.  Children learn the fundamental values that 
guide them throughout their lives from the examples set by their parents, especially their mothers.  
Even before they understand a language, they learn by observing and imitating the actions of their 
parents.   For almost fifty years, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution has 
protected a woman’s freedom to determine whether and when to become a mother.2  After decades 
of partisan political pressure and maneuvering, a new conservative majority appears poised to 
fundamentally change if not overturn Roe v. Wade, and its central holding that governing 
majorities may not substitute their judgment for the judgment of the pregnant individual until the 
fetus becomes a person capable of surviving outside of the womb.3  In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s 
Health Org., the Supreme Court will consider whether a state may substitute its own judgment 
after the fifteenth week of pregnancy rather than the twenty-fourth normally associated with 
viability.4  In anticipation of the appointments of Justices Kavanaugh and Coney Barrett, 
Mississippi and other states enacted laws in direct conflict with Roe.5  For example, Ohio enacted 
a law that prohibits abortions once a fetal heartbeat may be detected, and makes no exception for 
                                                
1 Professor of Law, Laura B. Chisolm Distinguished Research Scholar, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law.  I would like to thank Bryan Adamson, Caroline Corbin, Jessie Hill, and Steve Shiffrin for 
providing feedback on earlier versions of this essay. 
2 This essay recognizes that individuals of all gender identities, including transgender men and non-
conforming individuals, may become pregnant and seek an abortion; it uses “woman” or “women” as 
shorthand when referring to individuals that may become pregnant and must decide whether to carry the 
pregnancy to term because abortion restrictions disproportionately affect individuals assigned female at 
birth and are often targeted specially because of this assignment. 
3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (”we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may 
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
858 (1992) (“Even on the assumption that the central holding of Roe was in error, that error would go only 
to the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the recognition afforded by the Constitution to 
the woman’s liberty.”)  
4 945 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted ___ S. Ct. ___, 2021 WL 1951792 (Mem) (May 17, 2021). 
5 See, e.g., Emma Brown, More Abortion Restrictions Have Been Enacted in the U.S. This Year than in 
Any Other, NPR (Jul 9, 2021) (detailing new anti-abortion laws passed in anticipation of the new Supreme 
Court majority). 
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cases of rape or incest.6  Alabama enacted a law that prohibits all abortions except in cases in 
which the woman’s life is threatened or there is a lethal fetal anomaly.7   While courts have 
routinely stayed the implementation of these laws,8 anti-abortion advocates hope that the six 
conservative Justices, especially the five Catholic Justices, will conclude that the Fourteenth 
Amendment no longer limits the power of states to regulate, including ban, abortion prior to 
viability.  Whether the Fourteenth Amendment independently restricts the power of state to 
regulate abortion because a state’s interest in protecting life cannot outweigh a woman’s liberty 
interest is not the focus of this essay.  Instead, this essay argues that the First Amendment 
guarantees the pregnant woman the freedom to determine the course of their pregnancy and to 
determine when motherhood is in their best interest and the best interests of her child.  This is true 
even when the asserted state interest is protecting prenatal life.  Pregnancy and motherhood are 
expressive conduct under the Supreme Court’s current understanding of freedom of speech, and 
laws restricting abortion coerce the pregnant to express and/or endorse messages they refuse to 
express. 
 
Recognizing the fundamental expressive values implicated in compelling the pregnant to become 
mothers sheds new light on the liberty interests the Supreme Court previously recognized with 
regard to abortion.9  Moreover, the First Amendment’s prohibition against compelled expression, 
limits upon content and viewpoint based restrictions, and the scrutiny demanded when laws 
regulate both conduct and expression provide a more objective framework for evaluating the 
interests at stake.10  This framework is not only more appropriate for evaluating the interests at 
stake, it exposes the false modesty of judicial deference in substantive due process cases.  To the 
extent that Supreme Court has expanded the reach of the First Amendment in cases involving 
economic conduct, a corresponding recognition of the expressive interests at stake when women 
are compelled to identify as mothers reveals the unconstitutional of nature of restricting access to 
abortion even for the laudable purpose of protecting the unborn. 
 
This essay begins by explaining and evaluating the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions that 
consider whether and how the regulation of economic activities may conflict with interests 
protected by the First Amendment.  Part II.A. discusses the Justices’ current approach towards 
                                                
6 See OH ST §§ 2919.191 et seq. (2019); Gabe Rosenberg, A Bill Banning Most Abortions Becomes Law 
in Ohio, NPR (Apr. 11, 2019). 
7 See AL ST §§ 26-23H et seq. (2019). 
8 The Supreme Court recently broke with this practice when a majority of the justices allowed a Texas law 
authorizing private individuals to seek statutory damages against anyone performing or otherwise aiding in 
the abortion of a fetus after a “fetal heartbeat” may be detected to take effect.  See Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Austin Reeve Jackson, 594 U.S. ___ (2021) 
9 While this essay focuses upon the relationship between abortion and speech as I subsequently note the 
First Amendment’s protection of freedom of association and religion are also implicated. 
10 See infra Part III. 
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speech in Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colo. Civil Rights11 and Sorrell v IMS Health Inc.12  These 
decisions suggest that laws governing commercial transactions may implicate First Amendment 
concerns by dictating what information or beliefs may be conveyed through those transactions.  
When individuals are required to engage or refrain from conduct, their actions may take on 
symbolic meaning or play an integral role in facilitating speech protected under the First 
Amendment.  Part II.B. explains the value of considering whether expression is implicated when 
regulating what may traditionally have been considered non-expressive conduct, and why 
appreciating the legitimate reasons for testing the limits of expression still demands a healthy 
degree of skepticism.   
 
Part II.C. explains how the deferential standard of review developed in response to an earlier case 
involving the commercial relationship of bakers, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Lochner 
v. New York,13 both explains and justifies further consideration of the relationship between 
regulating conduct and concerns underlying the First Amendment’s protection of speech.  In its 
basic application, the rational basis test is not a standard of judicial review but a method of masking 
judicial bias for the ostensible purpose of deferring to elected representatives.  In contrast, when 
expressive values are at stake courts must independently determine that the purpose of the 
restriction is legitimate and that the means chosen fit that purpose without unduly intruding upon 
protected liberties. 
 
Part III. examines how a more expansive understanding of expression can be applied beyond 
commercial conduct.  Under the principle of what’s good for the goose is good for the gander, Part 
III.A. identifies the expression implicated by carrying a pregnancy to term; and explains why a 
woman’s interests in motherhood should receive the same First Amendment consideration as 
bakers and data brokers.  Laws prohibiting abortion compel women to assume the role of mother 
and to convey the corresponding beliefs and values that motherhood entails.  With respect to 
expression, this includes the transfer and sharing of information and beliefs, endorsing and 
celebrating moral and sectarian religious beliefs in which birth outweighs all other interests 
including whether the mother is ready and capable of providing for the physical and emotional 
needs of the child, the relationship between mother and child, and a woman’s place in society. 
 
Having explained the expressive interests at stake, Part III.B. argues that laws prohibiting abortion 
violate the First Amendment because they infringe the woman’s freedom to share and express 
beliefs in the manner of her own choosing, and are unrelated to the government’s power to protect 
health and safety.  This is true even if the professed purpose is protecting the health and safety of 
                                                
11 __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
12 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
13 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987) 
(discussing the significance of the Lochner decision). 
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the unborn.  Relying upon the findings of the landmark 2020 TURNAWAY STUDY,14 the essay 
illustrates why abortion restrictions do not advance a state’s legitimate interest in protecting the 
health and safety of its citizens.   
 
Lastly, Part III.C. explains the parallel problems raised by freedom of contract and reproduction, 
and how reproductive freedom may face the same Fourteenth Amendment obstacles as the freedom 
to contract.  However, even if the Supreme Court concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires courts to defer to a legislative judgement that abortion can be prohibited to protect the 
unborn, the First Amendment requires judges to independently evaluate whether those laws 
legitimately serve that interest.  Good intentions alone are insufficient to invade individual liberty 
if that invasion does not serve the purpose of safeguarding the life of the child.  Courts should not 
be allowed create a fictional world that allows them to ignore the real consequences to of denying 
access to abortion.  If laws restricting abortion will no longer be reviewed by courts under privacy 
and autonomy, women, like the bakers that preceded them, should find protection under the First 
Amendment.  
 
II. The First Amendment & Freedom of Contract 
 
The First Amendment specifically refers to freedom of speech and of the press, but the 
Amendment’s protection extends beyond the literal and protects expression and association more 
generally.  Freedom of speech protects individual expression even when the means of expression 
do not involve face to face verbal communication or the printing books, newspapers, and 
pamphlets.15 Among other acts, the First Amendment applies to the freedom to engage or refuse 
to engage in symbolic acts such as saluting,16 wearing armbands,17 burning flags,18 displaying a a 
license plate,19 or marching in a parade.20 Likewise, freedom of speech includes the freedom to 
determine when to join together with others,”21 denies government the authority to dictate the terms 
of those relationships, especially with whom they must associate.22  
 
                                                
14 DIANA GREEN FOSTER, THE TURNAWAY STUDY (Scribner 2020). 
15 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment. A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773 (2004) ("That the boundaries of the First 
Amendment are delineated by the ordinary language meaning of the word 'speech' is simply implausible."). 
16 See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
17 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
18 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
19 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
20 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) 
(holding that the First Amendment protects the freedom of parade organizers to decide who may march in 
their parade). 
21 NAACP v. Alabama 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (“to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs 
and ideas….”). 
22 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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Despite the broad scope of protection, First Amendment doctrine still focuses on speech.  Whether 
conduct is considered sufficiently expressive to be protected speech has considerable implications 
not simply as a predicate to a First Amendment claim, but, for determining the applicable standard 
of review.  Under established free speech doctrine, laws based upon the content of speech, the 
viewpoint expressed, or that compel individuals to refrain from or engage in expression are 
presumptively unconstitutional, and will only be considered permissible if they survive strict 
scrutiny.23  Correspondingly, content neutral laws that regulate both conduct and expression must 
survive intermediate scrutiny in which requires that the law serve a substantial government purpose 
unrelated to expression and that the means chosen interfere with the expression interests no more 
than necessary to achieve that purpose.24  In contrast, when expression is not present state 
regulation of conduct is considered presumptively constitutional and courts must only determine 
whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, or in other words, is not 
arbitrary or capricious.25  As such, a judicial determination that an act is speech has significant 
practical consequences and may even be dispositive.  For example, Gerald Gunther famously 
described strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”26 And, scholars have described the 
rational basis test as “toothless in truth.”27  Therefore, it should come as no surprise that litigants 
have an incentive to engage in what Fredrick Schauer describes as “First Amendment 
opportunism”28 in the hopes of achieving what Leslie Kendrick describes as “First Amendment 
expansionism.”29 
 
But what is speech?  After thousands of years of human interaction, one would think the answer 
would be simple.30  Such a belief would be wrong for two reasons.  First, human creativity and 
ingenuity continuously expand our opportunities for expression.  The framers of the constitution 
could not have imagined the advent of motion pictures, broadcast radio and television, or the 
Internet.   Second, society in general and courts in particular may recognize the expressive nature 
of conduct not traditionally considered speech such as parades, the wearing of armbands, the 
burning of flags, or access to social media.  Under these circumstances, judges engage in what has 
been described as translation, in which the First Amendment’s existing protection is logically 
extended to previously unrecognized expression.31   
                                                
23 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
24 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
25 See infra Part II.C. 
26 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
27 See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s Fees, 89 CAL. L. REV. 999 (2001). 
28 Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN 
ERA 175, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter OPPORTUNISM].   
29 Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199 (2015). 
30 See Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 98 N.Y.U L. REV. 318 (2018). 
31 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (protecting video games as 
expression); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (concluding that “expression by 
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However, what qualifies as speech can also be expanded for strategic or political ends.32  Under 
certain circumstances, the connection between conduct and expression is merely plausible.33  As 
mentioned above and explained in detail below, there are significant doctrinal and practical 
benefits to labeling an act speech rather than conduct.  During the same fifty years that 
conservatives argued for overturning Roe, many of these same conservative justices, from the 
Burger Court to the Roberts Court, have expanded the coverage of the First Amendment to include 
political contributions,34 commercial advertising,35 access to the means of transmitting data,36 the 
selling of video games,37 the sale of prescription data,38 the ownership of trademarks,39 surcharges 
on credit card purchases,40 and the sale of baked goods,41 commercial activities that were neither 
traditionally nor inherently protected speech. 
 
Critics argue that these doctrinal developments have more to do with a conservative agenda to 
insulate business interests and enshrine conservative social values than the protection of legitimate 
First Amendment interests.42  This essay will not dive into the debate over the definitional 
boundary between protected speech and unprotected acts,43 but instead “takes up the banner of 
radical reform” by acknowledging the “tension between judicial civil libertarianism and judicial 
deference to economic regulation,”44 and why freedom of expression may ease some of that 
tension.  While there are legitimate reasons to reject the conclusion that the First Amendment 
                                                
means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”) 
32 OPPORTUNISM, supra note 27 at 191 ("In numerous other instances, political, social, cultural, ideological, 
economic, and moral claims that are far wider than the First Amendment, and that appear to have no special 
philosophical or historical affinity with the First Amendment, find themselves transmogrified into First 
Amendment arguments."). 
33 See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 Wm. Mary L. Rev. 
1613 (2015) [hereinafter Coverage]; Shanor, supra note 29.   
34 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
35 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
36 See Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).  See also, Raymond Shih Ray Ku, 
Free Speech & Net Neutrality: A Response to Justice Kavanaugh, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 855 (2018-2019) 
(considering Justice Kavanaugh’s understanding of the free speech claims of Internet service providers). 
37 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
38 See Sorrell v IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
39 See Matal v Tam, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
40 See Expressions Hair Design, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1144 (2017)  
41 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1719 (2018). 
42 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199 
(2015); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015); Amanda Shanor, 
The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133. 
43 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct - The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 241 (2015); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, Situation-Altering Utterances, and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 (2005). 
44 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 2001 
(2016).  
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prohibits governments from regulating the offering of goods and services, the Supreme Court’s 
efforts to consider whether these acts are expressive, present a new and valuable insight into the 
constitutional role of the First Amendment.  In Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, Justice 
Breyer cautioned against an expansive definition of speech because, “virtually all government 
regulations affect speech.  Human relations take place through speech.  And human relations 
include community activities of all kinds -- commercial and otherwise.”45  Even if one agrees with 
Justice Breyer that all “human relations take place through speech,” the ubiquity of expression and 
its connection to human relations alone should not dismiss whether expressive values are at risk.  
As the old saying goes, actions can speak louder than words.   
 
A. Of Bakers and Data Brokers 
 
Are cakes speech, the act of baking them expression, and what message, if any, do their sales 
convey?  When a baker refuses to comply with anti-discrimination laws is that refusal protected 
by the First Amendment?  These questions were presented to the Supreme Court in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights after a baker refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex 
wedding.46  The baker argued that requiring him to do so violated his freedom of expression and 
exercise of religion.47  And while a majority of the Justices agreed that the baker in that case did 
not receive a fair hearing, it left the free speech questions for another day.48   What follows is not 
a detailed analysis of the decision itself, the arguments of the justices, or the commentary that 
surrounds it.  Instead, the decision introduces readers to the questions presented in cases like 
Masterpiece Cakeshop which require courts to determine when and how the First Amendment 
applies to conduct that rises to the level of expression or gives rise to expression.49 
 
The controversy in Masterpiece Cakeshop arose because a baker refused to provide a wedding 
cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding arguing that doing so would violate his First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and religion.50  The Colorado Civil Rights Division investigated after 
the couple lodged a complaint under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.51  The investigation 
found that the baker had “turned away customers on the basis of their sexual orientation,”52 by 
refusing to “create” wedding cakes, but also at least one instance in which he refused to sell 
                                                
45 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J. conc). 
46 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
47 Id.   
48 Id. at 1731-32. 
49 See Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 382-384 (2018) (arguing that 
the First Amendment protects individuals from government compulsion to create).  [hereinafter Compelled 
Speech].  But see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029 (2015) (concluding 
that commercial businesses may be compelled to produce speech under antidiscrimination laws). 
50 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724. 
51 Id. at 1725. 
52 Id. at 1725. 
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cupcakes that would be consumed at a same-sex commitment ceremony.53  In the latter instance, 
he informed that couple that his store “had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples 
for this type of event.”54  The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the baker concluding that 
the members of the state commission considering his appeal were openly hostile to religion.55  
Because it was unclear whether the wedding cake was a special item, the Court left the free speech 
question for another day.56 
 
Even though the majority in Masterpiece Cakeshop did not address the question, the answer is 
important because as Justice Thomas notes in his concurring opinion: 
 
[T]his Court has distinguished between regulations of speech and regulations of conduct.  The latter generally 
do not abridge freedom of speech, even if they impose “incidental burdens” on expression.57   
 
With respect to anti-discrimination laws, like those in Colorado, prohibiting discrimination based 
upon race, gender, religion, and other protected traits are consistent with the First Amendment 
because discrimination is conduct.58  As Thomas notes, “as a general matter,” public 
accommodations laws do not “target speech” but instead prohibit “the act of discrimination against 
individuals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges, and services.”59  However, 
citing the Supreme Court’s decisions holding that the First Amendment protected the decision of 
the organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade to exclude gay groups from openly marching in the 
parade and permitted the Boy Scouts of America to bar homosexuals from serving as troop 
leaders,60 Justice Thomas argues that when, “‘speech itself is to be the public accommodation’ the 
First Amendment applies with full force.”61  So even though the Masterpiece Cakeshop majority 
                                                
53 Id. at 1726. 
54 Id. 
55 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.  at 1732, 
56 While this essay focuses upon the First Amendment’s protection of speech, the concerns and 
observations are relevant to claims of freedom of religion as well.  For an excellent analysis of these issues 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop see Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech Conduct 
- The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L. J. 241, 248 (2015) (discussing the parallels 
between the freedom of speech and religion claims).  Freedom of religion is arguably even more relevant 
following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, ___ U.S. ___ (2021) and Tandon 
v. Newsom, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) (per curium) in which the Supreme Court expanded the Constitution’s 
protection of individuals based upon their religious beliefs.  Given that women seeking abortions do so 
because of sincerely held religious and moral beliefs, freedom of religion is likewise relevant and requires 
further consideration. 
57 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1741 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (citations omitted emphasis in original). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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did not address the question, it remains relevant and will inevitably require an answer from the 
Supreme Court.62   
 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker argued that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act violated 
his freedom of speech “by compelling him to exercise artistic talents to express a message with 
which he disagreed.”63  Importantly, he did not argue that he was compelled to compose or adopt 
a specific message, either written or visual.64  He was not asked to write a message or place an 
image on the cake.  Instead, the baker argued that the act of selling the wedding cake was itself 
speech.65  Conduct, however, does not become speech simply because it may “be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”66  The First 
Amendment applies to “conduct that is inherently expressive” and attributable to the actor.67  
According to the Supreme Court, this requires 1) the intent to convey a particularized message, 
and 2) in light of the circumstances the message would be understood by its viewers. 68  Under this 
approach, saluting69 or burning the American flag,70 wearing armbands,71 and marching in parades 
have all been considered protected speech.72   
 
Three Justices agreed with the baker that Colorado compelled him to convey the message that 
same-sex marriages are marriages and that they should be celebrated.  In a concurring opinion for 
himself and Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch concluded that not only does a cake without words 
convey a message, but it conveys the very message the baker wanted to avoid.  “Words or not and 
whatever the exact design, it celebrates a wedding, and if the wedding cake is made for a same-
                                                
62 See, e.g., Nelson Photography v. Louisville, 479 F. Supp.3d 543 (W.D. KY 2020) (concluding that a 
wedding photographer’s freedom of speech was violated by anti-discrimination law that required her to 
photograph same sex weddings); Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers Inc., 187 Wash.2d 804 (2017) (denying 
free speech claim of florist who refused to provide flowers to a same sex wedding), cert. granted, vacated 
and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop), on remand 
193 Wash.2d 469 (2019) (concluding that a florist’s freedom of speech was not violated), cert. denied, __ 
S. Ct. __ (2021), 2021 WL 2742795; Elaine Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2012), cert. denied 572 U.S. 1046 (2014) (rejecting the Free Speech claim of a photographer who refused 
to photograph a same sex wedding). 
63 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726 
64 See Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, 570 U.S. 205 (2013) (holding that the 
First Amendment prohibited government from requiring funding recipients “to adopt a particular belief”). 
65 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
66 United States v. O’Brien 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
67 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (concluding that 
requiring law schools could not prohibit military recruiters for recruiting on campus despite the schools’ 
unwilling to be associated with the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.). 
68 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (“An intent to convey a particularized message was 
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”). 
69 See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
70 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
71 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
72 See Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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sex couple it celebrates a same-sex wedding.”73 In other words, the cake is a symbol equivalent to 
“an emblem or flag.”74  Following this logic, Colorado violated the baker’s freedom of speech by 
forcing the baker to provide a flag to be used by others to express a message he did not share.75 
 
Writing for himself and Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas considered the baking of a wedding cake 
to be expressive and entitled to First Amendment protection.  First, “creating and designing custom 
wedding cakes” should be considered speech.76  The Justices found it important that the baker 
“considers himself an artist” and the creation of cakes requires, “sketching the design out on paper, 
choosing the color scheme, creating the frosting and decorations, baking and sculpting the cake, 
decorating it, and delivering it to the wedding.”77  Second, like Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas 
understood wedding cakes to convey a symbolic message, and he agreed with the baker that the 
cake communicates that “‘a wedding has occurred, a marriage has begun, and the couple should 
be celebrated.’”78  Finally, the baker’s customary involvement with wedding cakes further 
supported the conclusion that his conduct was expressive.  Justice Thomas explains that the baker 
personally consults with the couple, delivers the cake, “a focal point of the wedding celebration,” 
and may stay and interact with guests at the event, and attendees will recognize the cake as the 
baker’s creation and subsequently seek his services.79  Under these facts, Justice Thomas concludes 
that Colorado law would require the baker to use his artistic talent to “acknowledge that same-sex 
weddings are “weddings” and suggest that they should be celebrated,” both ideas with which he 
disagrees.80 
                                                
73 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J. conc.). 
74 Id. (Like ‘‘an emblem or flag,’’ a cake for a same-sex wedding is a symbol that serves as ‘‘a short cut 
from mind to mind,’’ signifying approval of a specific ‘‘system, idea, [or] institution.’’) (quoting West Virginia 
Bd. of Ed., 319 U.S. at 63). 
75 This description, however, does not accurately capture the issue raised in Masterpiece Cakeshop.  
Assuming that the First Amendment guarantees bakers the freedom to decide to bake cakes, as opposed 
to pies, and how to design those cakes, the Colorado law did not interfere with either of those decisions.  
Instead, the law limits the baker's discretion to refuse service to a customer interested in purchasing what 
the baker offered to the public.  While the First Amendment prohibits the government from forcing a writer 
to write or to dictate the contents of that writing, the writer’s freedom of expression is not violated because 
their words are read or used by someone with whom they disagree. [property cases] 
76 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742. 
77 Id. at 1742-43. 
78 Id. at 1743 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1744.  See Volokh, Compelled Speech, supra note 48 at 383 (arguing that even in absence of 
endorsement, the compulsion “still involves people being required ‘to foster … concepts’ with which they 
disagree and ‘to be an instrument for fostering public adherence’ to a view that they disapprove of -- Wooley 
tells us this is unconstitutional.”).  But see, Bhagwat, supra note 48 (arguing that protection for “producing 
speech must be limited is because producing speech can involve a wide range of conduct that can cause 
social harm entirely independent of the communicative impact of the eventual speech.”);  Steven H. Shiffrin, 
What is Wrong with Compelled Speech?, 29 J. L. & POL. 499, 506 (2014) (arguing that requiring a wedding 
photographer to capture photos at a gay wedding does not force photographers “to be couriers of messages 
to which they are ideologically opposed.”).  Steven Shiffrin argues that “[t]he First Amendment inquiry 
focuses on what is objectively conveyed through the photographs;” and wedding photos do not say anything 




In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg argues that neither the 
creation of wedding cakes, in particular, or the provision of baked goods, in general, constitutes 
expressive conduct.  According to Ginsburg, the baker's conduct in Masterpiece Cakeshop could 
not be “reasonably understood by an observer to be communicative.”81  There was no evidence 
that an objective observer would understand “a wedding cake to convey a message, much less that 
the observer understands the message to be the baker’s, rather than the marrying couple’s.”82  In 
other words, accepting the argument that a wedding cake symbolizes that the event is a wedding 
and that the wedding should be celebrated, these messages are not reasonably attributed to the 
baker.  In fact, no reasonable observer would know the baker’s identity unless that information 
was communicated by more than the cake itself.  In contrast a message of endorsement might 
reasonably be perceived if the law required the baker to publicly communicate his involvement to 
the wedding guests or if the baker was required to personally participate in the ceremony or attend 
the event.  In light of these opinions, the question of whether the conduct was expressive turned 
upon who determines the symbolism associated with a service or product, the producer or the 
audience.83 
 
While a dispute over wedding cakes might seem trivial to some, Masterpiece Cakeshop raises 
important questions about the relationship between conduct and speech.  The baker created the 
cake, and imbued the cake with his culinary and aesthetic choices.  As noted by Justice Thomas, 
it is completely plausible to consider the baker an artist and cakes his works of art.  From a First 
Amendment perspective, without any additional content, is that protected speech?84  If so, then the 
                                                
about the morality of the wedding, but capture the event.) Id. at 507.  Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling 
Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 647 (2001) (arguing that “the cases 
supposedly standing for the proposition that there is a right not to speak … stand for a right that is related 
to speech, in the sense that it involves the right not to be used as a vehicle for speech, but not for a right 
that is reducible to a right to be silent or a right to prevent misattribution...”). 
81 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749, n.1 (Ginsburg, J diss.) 
82 Id.  Accord Wash. v. Arlene’s Flowers, 293 Wash.2d at 511-513 (concluding that a floral arrangement did 
not “actually communicate something to the public at large” and is not inherently expressive).  
83 Arguably whether the cake itself is expressive is a First Amendment red herring.  Because of the limited 
message conveyed by the cake, the fundamental question is whether the relationship created by the sale 
of the cake implicates the baker’s freedom of association or expressive association.  As discussed later, 
these cases may be better understood through the First Amendment lens of association rather than speech.  
See infra note 169. 
84 Consideration of whether artistic or design choices are sufficient to qualify as expression is rooted in 
copyright law in which the question is whether the “author’s” work is sufficiently original in order to receive 
copyright protection as a writing.  See generally Feist Pubs. Inc., Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991) (considering whether a telephone directory is entitled to copyright protection).  While copyright 
issues may certainly involve freedom of expression, they are not necessarily one and the same.  See Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187 (2003) (concluding that a twenty-year extension of copyright protection did not 
violate the First Amendment); Harper & Row, Pub’l, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) 
(concluding a magazine’s freedom of speech was not violated when copyright law prohibited it from 
publishing excerpts from a manuscript without the authorization of the author).  See generally Raymond 
Shih Ray Ku, The First Amendment Implications of Copyright’s Double Standard, 17 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
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proverbial widget would be speech as long as its manufacturer claims to have imbued the widget 
with their creative choices and persona.85  Elon Musk might very well claim that Tesla automobiles 
embody his expression.  Moreover, what message does the cake embody?  While the cake conveys 
information that stimulates our senses, hopefully signaling to the brain that it is divine and 
instilling the diner with a sense of satisfaction and bliss, is that the kind of sensory stimulation and 
input contemplated by the First Amendment?  While these questions may sound esoteric, similar 
questions remain unanswered when considering when the regulation of video games and the virtual 
worlds and realities designed by programmers and generated by microprocessors violate the 
freedom of speech of developer and user.86  
 
Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc. illustrates another aspect of the expressive conduct problem: how does 
First Amendment apply to conduct that may, but does not necessarily, contribute to the creation of 
speech?  Specifically, how should courts review regulations that restrict the transfer of information 
and data?  In Sorrell, a majority of the justices concluded that a statute regulating the sale of 
medical prescription records violated the First Amendment.87   Vermont regulated the collection 
and dissemination of prescription information including information that would identify the 
prescriber.  The statute required the consent of the prescriber before prescription information 
identifying the prescriber could be sold or used for marketing purposes.88  This restriction was 
intended to protect the privacy of doctors, prevent drug companies from interfering with medical 
decisions, and to control prescription costs, and according to Vermont, the regulation of conduct 
unrelated to the suppression of expression.89  According to Justice Kennedy, the First Amendment 
                                                
J. 163 (2018); Derek Bambauer, Copyright = Speech, 65 EMORY L. J. 199 (2015); C. Edwin Baker, First 
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for 
Free Speech Law, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000).  Likewise, the relationship between art and the First 
Amendment has yet to be fully recognized.  See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic 
Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221 (1987) (arguing that 
Art should be considered subject to its own First Amendment analysis); Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 
VAND. L REV. 73 (1996) (same); Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PENN. J. OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 
1 (2007-2008) (arguing that Art should be considered as a unique form of speech) (same). 
85 Justice Thomas’ analysis tracks his opinion in Star Athletic, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 580 U.S. ___, 
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2016) in which he concluded that cheerleader uniforms were not excluded from copyright 
protection even if uniforms are considered useful articles which are statutorily excluded from copyright 
protection.  Under the “useful articles doctrine,” the widget would not receive copyright protection unless 
the artistic features can be identified separately from the utilitarian.  See Robert C. Denicola, Imagining 
Things: Copyright for Useful Articles After Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 635 (2018). 
Moreover, whether an individual’s creation should be considered their property is not the same as whether 
it conveys a message attributable to them. 
86 See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (discussing and debating the 
expressive elements of video games and when freedom of expression may be implicated).  See also, Mark 
A. Lemley, Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2017-
2018) (considering free speech claims for virtual and augmented reality); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Free 
Speech & Net Neutrality: A Response to Justice Kavanaugh, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 855 (2018-2019) 
(considering the free speech claims of Internet service providers). 
87 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557. 
88 Id. at 558-559. 
89 Id. at 560-561, 572-573 
Free Speech & 
Abortion 14
  
applied because the sale of this information was only prohibited based “in large part on the content 
of the purchaser’s speech”90 and by singling out the use of prescriber information only for 
marketing to prescribers.91  Likewise, because pharmaceutical manufacturers were the primary 
users of this information for marketing, and their practice was the focus of the legislation, the court 
concluded that it disfavored “specific speakers.”92  As such, Justice Kennedy argued that the law 
defied the application of intermediate scrutiny to cases involving the regulation of conduct because 
it had the effect of restricting speech based upon the identity of the speaker and the content and 
viewpoint they wished to express.93  Laws that regulate speech based upon content let alone 
viewpoint are presumptively unconstitutional. 
 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy concluded that, in addition to the restrictions placed upon the 
companies intending to use the information for marketing, the statute restricted the expression of 
those wishing to sell that information as well.  According to the majority, information is speech, 
and because the information possessed by pharmacies and insurance companies was “subjected to 
‘restraints on the way in which the information might be used’ or disseminated”94 it violated their 
speech interests as well.   In so doing, the Court rejected Vermont’s argument that the law regulated 
conduct and not speech. According to Kennedy, information cannot be considered “a mere 
‘commodity’ with no greater entitlement to First Amendment protection than ‘beef jerky.’”95  As 
a general proposition, gathering and publishing information is protected by the First Amendment.96  
And, according to Kennedy: 
 
Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human 
knowledge and to conduct human affairs.  There is thus a strong argument that prescriber identifying 
information is speech for First Amendment purposes.97 
 
                                                
90 Id. at 564. 
91 Id. 
92 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 564-565. 
93 Id. at 565-566. 
94 Id. at 568. 
95 Id. at 570. 
96 For example, the First Amendment recognizes the freedom of news organizations to both gather and 
publish facts, see, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (attending criminal 
trials); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (publishing the Pentagon Papers), but even 
that freedom is not absolute.  See Cohen v. Cowels Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (concluding 
that First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel claim for disclosing the identity of a source).  For 
example, Barry McDonald has argued that the First Amendment should only apply to certain recognized 
activities, see Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a 
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 250 (2004). But see 
Baghwat, supra note 48 at 1053 (arguing that the freedom to gather news should apply more generally).  
97 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570. 
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In other words, because information is often used for expression, a fortiori, information is speech. 
And, the law restricted speech even though prescriber information was not gathered for 
publication, or, in fact, published. 
 
Dissenting for himself and Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, Justice Breyer argued that the majority 
failed to distinguish between efforts to regulate the marketplace of ideas versus those that regulate 
the marketplace for goods and services.98  According to Breyer, this distinction is crucial: 
 
Because many, perhaps most, activities of human beings living together in communities take place through 
speech, and because speech-related risks and offsetting justifications differ upon context…., the First 
Amendment imposes tight restraints upon government efforts to restrict, e.g., “core” political speech, while 
imposing looser constraints when the government seeks to restrict, e.g., commercial speech….99 
 
Because of the ubiquity of speech, strict scrutiny should only apply when a law directly burdens 
speech whereas a “more lenient approach” applies when laws affect speech indirectly.100  With 
respect to the Vermont law, Justice Breyer emphasized that it did not impose any burden based 
upon speech itself.  No one was forbidden or compelled to say anything expressly or symbolically 
nor required to endorse any particular view.101  And, prior to Sorrell, the Court had never 
concluded that the First Amendment prohibited or required heightened scrutiny when a 
government restricts the “use of information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate,” as was 
the case in Sorrell.102   
 
To the extent that the Vermont law applied only to certain content and to certain parties, Justice 
Breyer argued that those distinctions are inherent in any system of regulation.103   For example, 
the Federal Drug Administration regulates “the form and content of labeling, advertising, and sales 
proposals of drugs, but not furniture,”104 and, “might control in detail just what a pharmaceutical 
firm can, and cannot, tell potential purchasers about its product.”105  Such regulations are content-
based because of the practice or industry being regulated, and they are “speaker-based” because 
only certain firms participate in that practice or industry.  As such, the distinctions can and were 
made based upon the nature of the regulated activity rather than a regulation of speech.  Under 
                                                
98 Id. at 583 (Breyer, J. diss.). 
99 Id. at 582. 
100 Id. at 584. 
101 Id. at 585-586. 
102 Id. at 588.  Some opinions suggest that the Constitution does not guarantee the most effective means 
to subsequently engage in speech.  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much 
less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method...”); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) (“Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority 
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech...”). 
103 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 589 (“Regulatory programs necessarily draw distinctions on the basis of content.”). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 590. 
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those circumstances, the First Amendment imposes no additional limits upon the government’s 
power to regulate the market and those participating in it.106 
 
B. Two Truths and a Lie 
 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Sorrell illustrate the legal implications of acknowledging that 
sometimes a cake is more than just dessert or that information is not the same as beef jerky.  The 
claim that a law regulating conduct impermissibly interferes with expression associated with that 
conduct requires courts to consider the expressive nature of conduct and how regulation of such 
fits within the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.  When parties invoke 
expression, courts engage in a more careful (and perhaps thoughtful) analysis of the purpose of the 
law and the extent to which the chosen means respond to the problem and the extent to which those 
means interfere with liberty.  This is true even when the claimed relationship to speech is 
exceedingly thin.107   What Frederick Schauer described as “First Amendment opportunism,”108 
serves three purposes, only two of which are legitimate.   
 
In the first category of cases, judicial review is justified because activities may be analogous to 
previously protected speech.  Under these circumstances, courts must determine whether 
regulation of that activity is covered by the First Amendment.109  For example, does the activity 
convey a particularized message, and in light of the surrounding circumstances, a great likelihood 
that the message would be understood by as such.110 Examples of these cases include First 
Amendment consideration of whether websites,111 Facebook posts,112 or posts to the President’s 
Twitter account,113 are examples of speech protected by the First Amendment.  While category 
one cases present novel questions, judges are only required to perform their traditional function of 
interpretation.   
                                                
106 If the First Amendment is, in fact, violated when restrictions are imposed based upon the content of the 
information, the circumstances in which that information may be used, and, as such, who may use that 
information, then an argument can be made that all data privacy laws are unconstitutional after Sorrell. 
107 Coverage, supra note 32  at 1616: 
What is most interesting about these various claims and arguments is not merely that some of them 
have been taken seriously.'" Rather, it is that they have been advanced at all, in contrast to what 
would have been expected a generation ago, when the suggestion that the First Amendment was 
even applicable to some of these activities would far more likely have produced judicial laughter or 
incredulity, if not Rule 11 sanctions.  
108 Schauer, Opportunism, supra note 27 at 176.  See also Kendrick, supra note 28 at 1206-1209. 
109 Coverage, supra note 32 at 1617-1621. 
110 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (“An intent to convey a particularized message was 
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”). 
111 Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
112 Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
113 Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) rehearing en banc denied, 953 
F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 2020). 
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Weddings cakes fall into this category, when courts must determine whether a cake is the speech 
of its baker, must it be customized, or include the baker’s signature or signature style?  For 
example, Eugene Volokh argues that Masterpiece Cakeshop raises the question of whether 
individuals can be compelled to create speech.114  He argues that even if there is no endorsement, 
compelled creation and dissemination still “involve people being required to ‘foster …. concepts’ 
with which they disagree and ‘to be an instrument for fostering public adherence’ to a view the 
disapprove of…”115  Likewise, the regulation of information gathering and dissemination raise 
important coverage and protection questions.  Is data gathering equivalent to newsgathering?  Is 
the transfer of information equivalent to publishing?  As Ashtosh Bhagwat argues relying upon 
the traditional content versus content-neutral distinctions as Justice Kennedy does in Sorrell is an 
imperfect analogy when it comes to laws regulating speech producing conduct because it does not 
adequately consider whether the harm being combatted is “related to the message or 
communicative impact,”116 or distinguish between instances in which the conduct leads to the 
production of speech of public versus private concern.117 
 
In category two cases, judicial review is justified because First Amendment coverage is plausible 
if doubtful.  Unless courts dismiss the claim out of hand, they must determine whether the activity 
is both covered and protected.118  In cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop, even if the First Amendment 
coverage is doubtful judges may nonetheless consider whether the activity is protected even if only 
to refute such claims.119  Under these circumstances, the First Amendment is applied “just in case” 
the initial coverage decision may be wrong or more complicated than it may appear. Even if the 
court is confident that the activity is not covered, they consider whether the regulation is 
nonetheless consistent with the corresponding degree of protection “even if” the conduct is 
covered.  Even though freedom of speech is not clearly implicated, parties benefit from the more 
careful consideration of legislative purpose and the fit between ends and means required by the 
First Amendment which would otherwise be unavailable.  As such, “the First Amendment offers 
strong protection at a seemingly low price of admission.”120  As discussed below, invoking 
                                                
114 Volokh, Compelled Speech, supra note 48 at 382-384. 
115 Id. 
116 Bhagwat, supra note 48 at 1063. 
117 Id a 1065. 
118 Kendrick, supra note 28 at 1200 (“These claims are examples of what has been called First Amendment 
opportunism, where litigants raise novel free speech claims that may involve the repackaging of other types 
of legal arguments.”). 
119 See David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (2005) (“Once in a while, a 
party will assert a free speech claim in a factual context judges recognize as involving expression but not 
free speech. To refute such claims, judges must make implicit free speech analysis explicit.”). 
120 Kendrick, supra note 28 at 1209.  Eugene Volokh argues, in my opinion persuasively, that instead of 
relying upon the speech/conduct distinction, First Amendment law would be better served by acknowledging 
that speech is implicated; that “[t]here are exceptions to the First Amendment’s protection, and the courts 
ought to identify the boundaries of those exceptions.”  See Volokh, Compelled Speech, supra note 48 at 
Free Speech & 
Abortion 18
  
freedom of expression under these circumstances is a logical response to the arguable lack of 
protection provided under the rational basis test of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 
In the final category of cases, the conduct is unrelated to the marketplace of ideas or deliberative 
democracy, but instead, is used to categorically insulate other interests from regulation.  In other 
words, the First Amendment is not invoked because the conduct should or may be expressive, or 
to justify a more thoughtful judicial review, but because it can be used to presumptively deny 
government the power to regulate the conduct.121  Expression is not a value, but rather a tool, the 
chisel to make a square peg fit into a round hole allowing both parties and judges to use the First 
Amendment to presumptively declare laws unconstitutional based upon the judge’s personal 
beliefs and worldview.122  Given the conclusory nature of some of the opinions in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and Sorrell, both may also fall into this category.  
 
Like the grifter in The Music Man who manages to convince the public that the local pool hall was 
trouble because “trouble begins with T which rhymes with P which stands for pool,” a talented 
lawyer and a receptive judge can exploit the broad outlines of expression to reach their preferred 
results.  In general selling cakes or information is not considered speech as that word is commonly 
used or reasonably understood.  These acts, however, can be connected to speech.   Consider the 
syllogisms that arise from Masterpiece Cakeshop and Sorrell.  In the former, the First Amendment 
protects speech; speech is a form of expression; expression is, therefore speech.  Conduct that is 
not speech nevertheless may be understood as expressing some idea or opinion, even indirectly; 
therefore, the conduct is protected speech.  The latter employs a different syllogism.  In Sorrell, 
speech conveys information; information is, therefore, an essential element of speech; transfer and 
access to information is, therefore, protected speech.  This simplistic and reductionist interpretation 
of the First Amendment ignores the reality that the Amendment does not protect all speech or 
apply simply because an activity may be labeled speech.123 
 
Even if one overlooks the logic, category three cases are especially troublesome because the First 
Amendment analysis employed is inherently conclusory.  By classifying conduct as speech, 
                                                
1337. Ultimately, I agree with Ashtosh Bhagwat conclusion that courts should not adopt a deferential 
standard of review but engage in searching judicial scrutiny.  See Bhagwat, supra note 48 at 1058-1066. 
121 See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 117 at 1417 (“A case is a free speech case when a judge says it is a 
free speech case … Because expression is present in every case, judges may engage in free speech 
analysis whenever they feel like it.”); Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 233 (2014) ("In several leading cases, conservative 
judges have used the First Amendment in a libertarian manner to invalidate regulations that reflected liberal 
or progressive values."); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment. A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1794 (2004) ("Similarly, objections to 
government regulation of business that were originally based on concern for economic liberty have become 
objections to the regulation of commercial advertising.. . ."). 
122 Kendrick, supra note 28 at 1210 (“Some would say that this is a more specifically political phenomenon: 
that what matters is who is making the First Amendment claim, or which judges are hearing it.”). 
123 See Coverage, supra note 29 at 1619-1621; Kendrick, supra note 28 at 1212-1216. 
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regulations of conduct not only restrict speech, they will do so selectively based upon the content 
and viewpoint expressed, and as such are presumptively invalid.124  A law requiring people to wear 
masks during a pandemic punishes only those individuals that refuse to obey the law.  For those 
that would prefer not to wear a mask, complying with the mandate is an endorsement of their 
efficacy and/or that the mandate is a legitimate exercise of government authority.  
Correspondingly, by refusing to wear a mask they are being punished by the government by being 
subject to civil or criminal sanctions and/or public scorn and criticism.  Prior to Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and Sorrell, courts would have acknowledged that such a law would limit the freedom 
of dissenters to express their dissent by violating the law.  However, so long as the purpose of such 
a mandate is to prevent the spread of a virus, the law would be upheld because the government 
could reasonably conclude that exceptions would in fact undermine the very purpose of the law, 
and that reasonable alternatives exist for dissenters to express their disagreement.  In this example, 
the only method of expression denied to dissenters is refusing to wear a mask free from legal and 
social consequences. 
 
In contrast, when courts consider speech the object of regulation, prohibiting the act will almost 
certainly be considered unconstitutional.  When the refusal to wear a mask is itself speech and 
considered the object of the regulation, dissenters may easily characterize the law as based upon 
the content of their expression, the efficacy of wearing masks and/or the authority of the 
government to mandate that individuals wear masks.  Because they disagree with the mandate, 
they are being punished based upon their viewpoint.  And, because the law primarily, if not 
exclusively applies to them, it singles out a specific group of speakers.  Under traditional speech 
analysis, laws restricting speech under these circumstances are rarely if ever considered 
constitutional.125  Even assuming that legitimate interests exist for wearing masks to prevent the 
spread of the deadly virus, the government would be denied the authority to prohibit the conduct. 
And, instead, it would either be required to recognize exceptions or limited to providing incentives 
to encourage people to wear masks or engage in speech of its own to inform the public of the 
importance of wearing masks.  Once it is determined that a law is the regulation of expression, the 
constitutional path and destination are essentially predetermined.  As Justice Kennedy noted in 
Sorrell, “In the ordinary case, it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content-based and, 
in practice, viewpoint discriminatory.”126 
 
C. Judicial Review Not Abdication 
 
                                                
124 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 2667 (“In the ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content 
based and, in practice, viewpoint based.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.”).  
125 In the modern era, the Supreme Court has only upheld one law based under strict scrutiny and did so 
because of national security concerns. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).  
126 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571.  
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There is a genuine jurisprudential reason to consider what otherwise could be rejected as legal 
sophistry in the second category of cases.  A fundamental axiom of judicial review is that judges 
do not evaluate the wisdom of laws.  Instead, they are supposed to limit their consideration to 
whether the challenged law is within the scope of the government’s powers and whether the means 
chosen are reasonably adapted to those ends.  Put differently, under the U.S. Constitution, judges 
guard against the exercise of arbitrary and invidious power, not wrongheaded or, even, erroneous 
policies.  The difference between declaring a law unconstitutional because it is arbitrary versus 
wrong is what separates judicial review from judicial activism.  The Supreme Court’s adoption of 
principles of laissez faire economics and deregulation as exemplified in Lochner v New York, is 
one of the few, if not only, instances in which the Justices have been universally condemned for 
engaging in such activism.127  Much has been written about Lochner and how cases like 
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Sorrell may represent a new effort to enforce principles of 
deregulation.128  This essay does not engage in that debate, but rather explains that in response to 
Lochner, judicial review of claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment may be laughable and 
conclusory in its own right.129  This is currently true for laws regulating business and commercial 
interests, and, if anti-abortion advocates are successful, will be true for a woman’s freedom to 
terminate her pregnancy.130  Under these circumstances, reliance upon a fundamental 
constitutional interest like those protected by the First Amendment, is one of the few means of 
avoiding a constitutional dead end.  
 
Today, the principle that states may exercise their police power to regulate the terms and conditions 
of contracts, employment, and commerce in general is firmly established.  As the Supreme Court 
noted: 
 
                                                
127 See, e.g., Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“The doctrine that ... due process authorizes 
courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely,” we later 
explained, “has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that 
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are 
elected to pass laws.”); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (Overtones of some arguments 
suggest that Lochner v. New York … should be our guide. But we decline that invitation…. We do not sit 
as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions.``); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) 
("We agree, of course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
'does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."') (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).  See also David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 2 (2003) (“The ghost of Lochner v. New York haunts American constitutional law. Almost one hundred 
years after the Supreme Court decided the case, Lochner and its progeny remain the touchstone of judicial 
error. Avoiding Lochner's mistake is the "central obsession" of modern constitutional law.”) (footnotes 
omitted); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 269 (1998) ("[M]odern judges are more 
disturbed by the charge of Lochnering than the charge of ignoring the intentions of the Federalists and 
Republicans who wrote the formal text."). 
128 See supra note 21. 
129 See, e.g., Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
898 (2005) (describing the rational basis test as “insane” and “dishonest”);  
130 See infra Part III.C. 
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Under our form of government, the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of 
private, and not of public, concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. 
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute, for government cannot exist if the citizen may at 
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. 
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.131 
 
In short, “The Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or 
to conduct it as one pleases.”132 As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, “The structure of economic 
and commercial life is a matter of political compromise, not constitutional principles….”133  
However, simply because the states have the power to regulate business, does not mean that laws 
regulating business are necessarily constitutional.  Instead, Due Process requires that “the law shall 
not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and 
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.”134  Under what is now referred to as the 
rational basis test, a law is constitutional as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.  Laws regulating the hours bakers may work or whether they must bake 
wedding cakes for same-sex marriages are considered consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment 
and its guarantee of due process of law because they are rationally related to the power of states, 
in Justice Marshall’s words, to structure economic and commercial life. 
 
Having concluded that the power to regulate economic and commercial conduct falls within the 
police power, unless another interest, like freedom of speech, is at stake, the remaining question is 
whether the law passes rational basis review.  Unfortunately, rational basis review has meant very 
different things to different people, and at different times.135  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                
131 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (citations omitted). 
132 Id. at 527-528. 
133 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 472 U.S. 432, 472 (1985) (Marshall, J., conc. in part).  See also 
Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 524-525: 
 
These correlative rights, that of the citizen to exercise exclusive dominion over property and freely 
to contract about his affairs, and that of the state to regulate the use of property and the conduct of 
business, are always in collision. No exercise of the private right can be imagined which will not in 
some respect, however slight, affect the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate 
the conduct of the citizen which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property. But 
subject only to constitutional restraint the private right must yield to the public need. 
 
134 Id. at 511. 
135 See, e.g., James M. McGoldrick Jr., The Rational Basis Test and Why It Is So irrational: An Eighty-Year 
Retrospective, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751 (2018) (discussing the history of the rational basis test under Due 
Process and Equal Protection cases); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational Basis and the Right to Be Free 
of Arbitrary Legislation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493 (2016) (discussing the evolution of the rational basis 
test for due process).   See also, Aaron Belzer, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. 
ST. U.L. REV. 239 (2014) (discussing the evolution of the rational basis test under equal protection). But 
see Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317 (2018) (arguing that 
the teaching of rational basis review is both incomplete and misleading); Thomas B. Nachbar, The 
Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627 (2016) (arguing for the importance of considering 
non-instrumental ends); Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 281 (2015) (arguing for the importance of rational basis review for establishing a floor). 
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U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz136 illustrates the range of what rational basis review entails 
and its consequences in a single decision.  Congress restructured the benefits offered to railroad 
employees in the 1974 Railroad Retirement Act, and denied benefits to a group of workers that 
would otherwise have qualified under the prior Act.137  Congress, however, provided those benefits 
to a similar group of workers if they had a “current connection” with the railroad industry as of the 
cutoff date.138  The District Court concluded that the “current connection” distinction was not 
rationally related to the purpose of the Act, and, therefore the exclusion of the plaintiffs was 
unconstitutional.139  The Supreme Court disagreed with a majority of the Justices concluding that 
the Act satisfied the rational basis test.   
 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion employs the most deferential approach.  According to 
Rehnquist, “the plain language of [the provision in question] makes the beginning and end of our 
inquiry.”140  As such, the purpose of the statute was to divide railroad retirees into two separate 
classes only one of which would receive benefits under the prior Act.141  Having concluded that 
the purpose was legitimate, the Court moved on to whether the purpose was achieved in “a patently 
arbitrary or irrational way.”142  According to Rehnquist, this portion of the test was easily satisfied 
because when “there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of 
course, ‘constitutionally irrelevant whether [the reasoning articulated by the Court] in fact underlay 
the legislative decision’....”143   
 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens argued that “the Constitution requires something more 
than merely a “conceivable” or “plausible” explanation for the unequal treatment.”144  Instead, 
Stevens proposed what might be considered an objective test in which the Court, “must discover 
a correlation between the classification and either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate 
purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature.”145 The 
Retirement Act satisfied this test because to protect the solvency of the retirement program it was 
reasonable to preserve some benefits while ending others, and differentiating beneficiaries based 
upon the timing of their service was reasonable.146  
 
                                                
136 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
137 Id. at 168-173. 
138 Id. at 171-172. 
139 Id. at 174. 
140 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176. 
141 Id. at 177. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 179. 
144 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J. conc.). 
145 Id. 180-181. 
146 Id. 182. 
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In contrast, writing for himself and Justice Marshall in dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the 
majority for adopting a “mode of analysis employed by the Court in this case virtually immunizes 
social and economic legislative classifications from judicial review.”147  According to Brennan, 
one of the purposes of the Act was to preserve the vested benefits of workers who had earned them 
under the original Act.  As such, denying those benefits to workers without a current connection 
was not only arbitrary and irrational, but “inimical” to its purpose.148  In reaching this conclusion, 
Justice Brennan relied upon the House and Senate Reports which characterized the preservation 
of vested rights for individuals such as the plaintiffs as a “Principal Purpose of the Bill.”149  
Without going into further detail, his opinion criticizes the majority’s “plain” language analysis as 
tautological, that rational basis requires consideration of the actual purpose rather than post-hoc 
justifications offered by Government attorneys, and even accepting such arguments must still 
consider whether they “genuinely support such judgment.”150  With regard to the final point, even 
if the Court were to accept the argument that the decision was based upon “equitable” 
considerations, the Court must still evaluate “what principles of equity or fairness might genuinely 
support such a judgment.”151  Unfortunately, while there have been some glimpses of Justice 
Brennan’s approach in more recent Supreme Court decisions, Justice Rehnquist’s “plausible” test 
remains the standard.152 
 
When the standard of review requires only that the law serve some hypothetically legitimate 
purpose, legal fiction replaces what might be an otherwise inconvenient truth.  While line drawing 
may be inevitable, in may nonetheless be arbitrary.153  In its most deferential form, the promise of 
rational basis review is an empty promise.  In many respects, this is the polar opposite of Lochner.   
Instead of relying upon their own preferences to evaluate the law, judges are mandated to use their 
creativity to defend the law.  If judges are not only free to rationalize and justify a law post hoc 
but required to do so, the constitutionality of the law does not turn on the law’s legitimacy, but 
upon the considerable creativity of lawyers and the subjective limits of a judge’s willingness to 
                                                
147 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 183 (Brennan, J. diss.). 
148 Id. at 185-186. 
149 Id. at 185. 
150 Id. at 194. 
151 Id. at 194. 
152 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, ___ (1996) (“even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for 
the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and 
the object to be attained.”) (concluding that a State constitutional amendment denying protected status 
persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships” 
fails, indeed defies, even this constitutional inquiry”); Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 588, ___ (2003) 
(concluding that state may only regulate the conduct of individuals to “prevent injury to a person or abuse 
of an institution the law protects”).  
153 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (distinguishing between 
established pushcart vendors over newer ones); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (concluding 
that it was no irrational permit only lawyers to engage in the business of debt adjusting); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (holding that optometrists or ophthalmologists may independently 
fit glasses, but opticians may only do so with a prescription from an optometrists or ophthalmologists). 
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suspend disbelief.  As such, because contracts are of genuine public concern, any law regulating 
contracts will be upheld even if the law does not advance the concern or does so arbitrarily.     Given 
what Justice Brennan decried as a “toothless”154 standard of review, the only way for a baker to 
get their objection taken seriously is to test the boundaries of expression.155 
 
III. The First Amendment & Reproductive Freedom 
 
If there are legitimate reasons to reconsider the expressive interests at stake when commercial 
conduct is regulated, those reasons apply with equal if not greater force when personal conduct is 
targeted.  This section considers how this approach might with regard to one of the most 
contentions questions of individual autonomy: control over pregnancy.156  What if any expressive 
interests are at stake when states seek to restrict or ban abortion?  This part begins by identifying 
the expression associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood, and explains how 
compelling a woman to carry a pregnancy to term is covered by the First Amendment.  Part III.B. 
discusses when the government’s purpose is to protect prenatal life. 
 
A. Of Pregnancy, Birth, and Motherhood 
 
What does it say when a woman gives birth to a child?  What messages are compelled if she is 
forced to carry a pregnancy to term?  Remember: according to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Sorrell, the expressive act was the transfer of personal identifying prescriber information. In 
Masterpiece Cake, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch concluded that the wedding cake represented the 
endorsement of the legality of sex-marriage, that such unions were consistent with the baker’s 
religious beliefs, and events to be celebrated.  Because the messages associated with abortion and 
having a child are so clear and straightforward, the following is limited to messages that parallel 
those identified by the Supreme Court in the cases above.   
 
                                                
154 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 184. 
155 Of course, except in category three cases, judicial review does not guarantee judicial victory.  Even 
under First Amendment scrutiny bakers should not be exempt from public accommodations or other anti-
discrimination laws because ending discrimination in places of public accommodation is a compelling 
government interest. See Board of Directors of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 
(1987) (assuming that public accommodation laws infringe freedom of association, “the infringement is 
justified because it serves the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women”); 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (recognizing “eliminating discrimination and assuring its 
citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services ... plainly serves compelling state interests 
of the highest order.”) 
156 For example, as described below, pregnancy and childbirth are more likely than selling wedding cakes 
to satisfy the test proposed by Caroline Corbin that “compelled expressive conduct should trigger free 
speech scrutiny only when someone is forced by their actions into conveying a viewpoint they disagree 
with.”  Corbin, supra note 42 at 261. 
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“We are cut from the same cloth.” Conception, pregnancy, and birth are many things, but at the 
most fundamental and basic level, they are the transfer of information.  The primary function of 
conception is to pass the combined genetic code of egg and sperm to the next generation.157  A 
woman’s contribution of information represents the blueprint of her physical, cognitive, and 
emotional existence.  Recent research on intergenerational trauma suggests that a mother’s 
experiences are also shared during her pregnancy.158  The expressive nature of childbirth is so well 
ingrained it is the primary metaphor for artistic expression.  Artists and inventors often describe 
their works in terms of children, and the complicated, personal creative process is often analogized 
to giving birth.  As such, whether to have a child is, among other things, a decision about whether 
to transfer the most fundamental and personal of information, the blue print and instructions, that 
make us who we are to the next generation.  Likewise, this transfer of information enables a parent 
to raise and educate their child passing on their values and beliefs: a freedom long recognized by 
Supreme Court.159  
 
“I’m having a baby.” Pregnancy itself conveys information as well.  The physical state of 
pregnancy, especially when one “shows,” conveys information to anyone who sees her, family, 
friends, and strangers alike, and the pregnant woman may prefer not to share that information or 
to control how and when that information is shared.  While Justice O’Connor emphasized that 
motherhood, “ennobles her in the eyes of others,”160 Justice Blackmun recognized that, “In other 
cases, ... the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be 
involved.”161  The state of being pregnant conveys that she engaged in intercourse, and depending 
upon her situation, community, and upbringing, an act that may be considered irresponsible, 
immoral, or even criminal.  Those informed about the pregnancy may not only use that information 
to judge her but may otherwise change their behavior for good or ill.  And, per Sorrell, businesses 
may use the information to market goods and services to her.  With respect to information sharing, 
terminating a pregnancy is a decision not to share information regarding one’s physical and 
reproductive status with others.162 
                                                
157 The fact that this information is not readily visible should not be a bar to First Amendment consideration.  
For example, computer code is considered speech subject to First Amendment protection.  See Junger v. 
Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v United States, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). 
158  
159 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing the freedom of parents to instruct their 
children in a foreign language); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing the freedom 
of parents to choose private education rather than public); Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
(recognizing the freedom of parents to determine when to end their children’s public education). While these 
decisions were decided under substantive due process, the Justices have recognized their connection to 
speech as well.  See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).  See also Eugene Volokh, 
Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631 (2006) (arguing that 
communications between parents and their children are protected by the First Amendment). 
160 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
161 Roe 410 U.S. at 153. 
162 Correspondingly, requiring women to carry a pregnancy to term compels her to say “I’m having his baby” 
even if that information is not shared with the sperm provider as conception results from the combination 
of genetic information. 




“Good news.” Likewise, pregnancy and a child’s existence convey ideas, beliefs, and opinions the 
woman may not share or wish to express.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion is replete with references 
to the “profound and lasting meaning” associated with the decision to continue or terminate a 
pregnancy, and the conflicting views on the subject.163  For example some people have, “such 
reverence for the wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full 
term no matter how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-being.”164  In 
contrast, others believe “that the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a 
cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent.”165  As a matter of expression, a woman may 
object to being seen as endorsing or celebrating one or both beliefs, or any of the “infinite 
variations.”166  Beyond personal circumstances, the woman may likewise object to being 
associated with the belief that giving birth is the right or moral message in a world when there are 
already children that could use a good home and when population growth contributes to poverty, 
overpopulation, and environmental decline. 
 
“Abortion is murder.” Moreover, because opponents of abortion have inextricably linked the act 
to questions of morality and good versus evil, pregnancy and childbirth are now viewed in starkly 
moral terms as well.  Abortion is murder, evil, and inconsistent with the teachings of specific 
religions.  And, by extension, someone that would choose an abortion is a murderer, evil, and 
sinful.  It should go without saying that a woman may object to being seen as advocating or 
endorsing such messages even if she may personally agree.  
 
“The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife 
and mother.”167 Laws prohibiting abortion fundamentally change the meaning of motherhood and 
childbirth.  If compelled to carry a child to term, conformance may be understood as acceptance 
or endorsement of a specific and historically subordinate role in society.  This would include the 
message that a woman’s role in society is to bear and raise children, and that she bears primary 
responsibility.  Likewise, she may object to the message that carrying a child to term is more 
important than her physical and emotional wellbeing, the nature and quality of her life, or 
continuing her education or pursuing a career.  Carrying a pregnancy to term may also represent 
acceptance or endorsement of systemic gender discrimination because without reproductive 
control, women literally have no control over their future, and that lack of control results in lifelong 
social and economic disparities.  Finally, a woman may not want her pregnancy, giving birth, and 
the child to be seen as a celebration or cause for celebration especially in cases of rape and incest, 
or a constant reminder that she is “having his baby.”   
                                                
163 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873. 
164 Id. at 853. 
165 Id. at 853. 
166 Id. at 853. 
167 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J. conc.). 
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Correspondingly, denying women the freedom to decide when to bear children alters the message 
for those that affirmatively choose to carry the pregnancy to term.168  For example, women who 
choose to become mothers of children with down syndrome or genetic abnormalities often do so 
because the decision reflects their beliefs regarding life and motherhood, and allows them to 
convey their views and opinions to others.169 However, when all women are required to carry 
pregnancies to term, the law alters the message of those that freely choose to do so.  From the 
perspective of an outside observer, there is no difference between those that wish to celebrate the 
event and welcome the challenges to come, and those who do not. 
 
Unlike Masterpiece Cakeshop and Sorrell, there is one more set of ideas and beliefs that a woman 
may not want to express or endorse.  The birth of a child automatically assigns the woman the role 
of mother, whether she chooses to embrace that role or not, and inescapably creates an expressive 
relationship mother and child.  A woman who raises a child may believe that she is communicating 
to the child that this is the best that she can do as a mother, or that she is either incapable or 
unwilling to provide the child with a better upbringing.  She may object to the idea that she and 
the child can be used to endorse and celebrate the idea that any time is the right time to become a 
mother.  Correspondingly, compelling women to give birth means that some women will choose 
to give the child up for adoption, to place the child in the custody of the state, or worse, abandon 
the child to fate.  In other words, the woman may choose to deny “the infant a bond of love.”170  
Under these circumstances, at the very least, she may not want to convey the idea that she wanted 
to abandon the child, does not love or care about the child’s future.  Correspondingly, she may not 
want the child to interpret her decision as a message that they are not wanted or unloved, and 
specifically, that their own mother neither wanted or loved them.   
 
These are just a few examples of the beliefs and messages conveyed when women are forced to 
carry pregnancies to term.  Of course, there are many positive messages connected to pregnancy 
and giving birth, but the question is not whether some people would voice different opinions; it is 
whether the First Amendment protects those that object to conveying or endorsing the 
government’s message.  Once a child is born, a woman is automatically assigned the role of 
mother.  Values, identity and responsibilities come with this role, and her actions necessarily 
confer information and messages even when she objects to the role or would prefer to remain 
silent.   
 
If forced to carry a pregnancy to term, the information that a woman is forced to provide to others, 
and the associated messages to which she might object are more clear, profound, and long lasting 
than the speech at issue in Sorrell or Masterpiece Cakeshop.  The data broker did not play a role 
                                                
168 I am indebted to B. Jessie Hill for this observation. 
169 SEE CHRIS KAPOSY, CHOOSING DOWN SYNDROME: ETHICS AND PRENATAL TESTING TECHNIQUES (2018). 
170 Casey, 505 U.S. at 853. 
Free Speech & 
Abortion 28
  
in creating the data and has no interest in the content of the information, only its commercial value.  
Even then the prescriber information will not necessarily be incorporated into even commercial 
speech, but may simply be used to estimate the number of pills to produce for the next quarter.  
Likewise, unless the baker chooses to publicize their involvement with the wedding, they are only 
required to sell a cake.  The baker is not forced to spend time with the couple, attend or participate 
in the event, and is certainly not required to offer congratulations to the happy couple.  In both 
cases, the messages are barely discernible and fleeting at best.   
 
In contrast, the messages conveyed by pregnancy go to the core of human identity, dignity, and 
morality.  They address the meaning of life, liberty, and the principles of free government.  Once 
again, as Justice O’Connor described, reproductive freedom concerns “not only the meaning of 
procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it.”171  Moreover, women and the 
potential life they carry are inextricably and permanently bound together.  During pregnancy, they 
are connected in the most intimate of ways, as the fetus is both part of her and inside of her, and 
her pregnancy is there for the entire world to see.  She cannot hide the fact that she is pregnant or 
that her pregnancy has ended without taking extreme measures and even then, will not be able to 
hide those facts from everyone.  While drug manufacturers might prefer to use prescriber data, 
they are still free to obtain that information from the doctors directly and to market and sell their 
products without that additional information.  And, while the baker may be morally offended by a 
client that wants to purchase a cake, that may be their only interaction, and the baker can continue 
to sell wedding cakes to heterosexual couples.  The messages are based upon commercial 
transactions.  In contrast, when a woman is forced to carry a pregnancy to term, the messages she 
sends are unique to her and to her child, and they will continue for the remainder of their lives.172   
                                                
171 Id. 
172 Reproductive freedom is not the only liberty guaranteed by the Supreme Court that implicates freedom 
of expression as well.  The Supreme Court has long recognized the freedom of parents to determine how 
to educate their children.  See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (foreign language instruction); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (private education); Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) (ending instruction).  Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized the freedom of individuals to 
express love and affection for one another.  See Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of 
contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (same sex sexual activity); Obergefell v. Hodges (same sex marriage).  These cases involve 
freedom of expression and association as much as they do individual interests in autonomy, privacy, 
equality, and religion.  For example, Lawrence Tribe has argued: 
 
In the end, what anchors all of these decisions - from Meyer and Pierce to Griswold and Lawrence 
- most firmly in the Constitution's explicit text and not solely in the premise of self-rule implicit in the 
entire constitutional edifice is probably the First Amendment's ban on government abridgements of 
"speech" and "peacabl[e] … assembl[y]," taking those terms in their most capacious sense. 
 
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1893, 1939-1940 (2004).  See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled 
Association, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 839, 841-842 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s protection of 
freedom of association places too much on the messages those associations make to the public rather than 
their importance in internal formation of thoughts and ideas) (“Intimate associations, such as the family, 
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Lastly, it is impossible for women to disassociate themselves from the messages expressed by 
pregnancy and childbirth.  In cases in which the individual is not compelled to speak but may be 
required to otherwise accommodate expression, the Supreme Court has consistently considered 
whether the complainant is capable of communicating that they are neither the source nor endorse 
the message to which they object.173  As discussed above, the connection between mother and 
child is lifelong and, even if a mother chooses to withhold her identity from the child, it is 
impossible for her to dissociate herself from the myriad messages conveyed by her pregnancy and 
subsequent birth. 
 
Once we consider whether pregnancy and childbirth may reasonably be understood as expressing 
certain ideas and beliefs, it becomes clear that laws prohibiting abortion interfere with a woman’s 
decision to share important personal information and communicate core values and beliefs.  In 
other words, the First Amendment covers a woman’s decision to carry a pregnancy to term. 
 
B. Freedom of Expression Embraces Reproductive Freedom 
 
The First Amendment covers pregnant women the freedom to obtain safe abortions.  By itself, this 
is a rather remarkable proposition.  Abortion is a medical procedure, and freedom of speech is not 
the first freedom or right that comes to mind.  Historically, the constitutional question is considered 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and, a woman’s freedom to obtain an abortion is protected by 
the Due Process Clause.174  By preventing a woman from safely ending a pregnancy, abortion 
restrictions deny her the freedom to make the most personal decisions about herself and her life 
thus deny her the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.175  Likewise, efforts to restrict 
                                                
friendships, and other close personal relationships, are sites for the formation and transfer of culture and 
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Principle: Abortion, Free Speech, and Religious Freedom, 28 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 407 (2019) (arguing 
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173 See Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (concluding that a shopping center 
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expression); Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (concluding that requiring cable 
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abortion have been considered violations of the Equal Protection Clause because of the traditional 
political and legal subjugation of women,176 and, as Justice Ginsburg noted, the ability of women 
to “realize their full potential … is intimately connected to ‘their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.””177  However, as the preceding demonstrates, compelling women to give birth 
to a child interferes with their expression as well.  Denying the opportunity to obtain safe abortions 
compels women to share and communicate information, endorse ideas and opinions to which they 
object or which they would prefer not to discuss, and/or “the right not to be used as a vehicle for 
speech.”178  How would these claims be evaluated under the First Amendment?  Even if freedom 
of speech is implicated is a state’s interest in the protection of life sufficiently compelling to justify 
any restriction upon the woman’s expression? 
 
1. Women are not Symbols 
 
Initially, one could argue that forcing a woman to give birth is presumptively invalid because it 
regulates the content of her expression.  Under Justice Thomas’ understanding in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, compelled reproduction is compelled speech.  The First Amendment denies the 
government the authority to force individuals to salute the flag and pledge allegiance,179 display a 
message,180 or contribute to a cause.181  As the Justices have noted: “At the heart of the First 
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and 
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”182  It is only logical to recognize 
that this principle should apply to compelling a woman to assume the identity and role of mother.  
Moreover, the nature of the compelled expression makes this circumstance particularly 
concerning.  Anti-abortion legislation does not address injuries suffered by the public; supporters 
seek to compel others to follow their personal beliefs regarding the sanctity of life.  As Justice 
Blackmun established in Roe v. Wade, there has never been any religious, scientific, or political 
consensus on when a fetus should be considered a person, and the Constitution speaks only in post-
natal terms.183  This is the fundamental reason for both the holding in Roe and its reaffirmation in 
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey that state authority to prohibit abortions begins at viability.184  Aside 
from viability or live birth, any other definition is essentially arbitrary and implicates the freedom 
of religion protected by the First Amendment because it compels dissenters to accept, endorse, and 
celebrate a particular religious belief.  As discussed above, the pregnancy, birth, and the child’s 
existence are symbols and testaments to such beliefs. 
 
Relying upon Sorrell, one could argue that the law is unconstitutional because it punishes 
expression based upon its content, viewpoint, and identity of the speaker.  Restrictions on abortion 
are based upon a pregnant woman’s objection to endorsing and celebrating the belief that life 
begins at conception, and/or that a fetus is a person.  They single out individuals capable of bearing 
children and penalize those that, at least for the time being, object to expressing an opinion on the 
topic of pregnancy or motherhood.  In the words of Justice Kennedy, the law “singles out” a 
disfavored viewpoint and targets that restriction only at the group with the most at stake.  As the 
preceding demonstrates, with respect to a fetus that can only survive in a woman’s uterus, denying 
women the freedom to determine whether to give birth compels them to play the role of mother 
forcing them to adopt a disputed, often sectarian definition of life, to endorse that definition and 
celebrate its message.  Again, under these circumstances, anti-abortion laws would be 
presumptively unconstitutional.185   
 
2. “An Abstract Interest in Life” 
 
But isn’t abortion different because abortion end life?  Roe itself recognized that States have a 
legitimate interest in protecting prenatal life even before viability.186 As such, the public’s interest 
protecting life, specifically the child’s life, should be a sufficiently compelling government interest 
capable of outweighing a woman’s expression.  Assuming for the purposes of this analysis, that 
laws punishing speakers based upon the content of their communication or compelling them to 
convey the government’s could still be upheld if they otherwise survive strict scrutiny, which 
requires that the law to serve both a compelling government interest AND be the least restrictive 
means to achieve that interest,187 limiting access to abortion is not sufficiently tailored to achieve 
the purpose even under the more deferential standard of review establish in the seminal case of 
United States v. O’Brien.188  In that decision, the Supreme Court concluded that “when ‘speech’ 
and ‘non-speech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
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government interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.”189  Such a law is constitutional if:  
 
[I]t is within the constitutional power of the Government; furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restrictions on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.190 
 
In both Masterpiece Cakeshop and Sorrell, the Justices acknowledged that “the First Amendment 
does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens 
on speech.  That is why a ban on race-based hiring may require employers to remove ‘White 
Applicants Only signs ...”191  However, they did not consider the O’Brien test arguing that the law 
imposed more than an incidental burden on speech.  Justice Thomas distinguished O'Brien, arguing 
that the test, “does not apply unless the government would have punished the conduct regardless 
of the expressive component.”192   Justice Kennedy likewise rejected this approach because the 
privacy law “on its face and in its practical operation … imposes a burden based on the content of 
speech and the identity of the speaker.”193      
 
Supporters of laws restricting abortion will argue that these laws satisfy O’Brien because the 
government has the power, if not duty, to protect the health and safety of its citizens.  Abortion is 
conduct that ends potential life, and denying access to abortion is a legitimate means of protecting 
that life.  Moreover, even if abortion is banned, individuals remain free to express their opinions 
on the subject and to persuade others to adopt their views personally or through the political 
process.  As discussed below, while protecting prenatal life may be a substantial or even 
compelling government interest the purpose of protecting the life of the unborn only satisfies the 
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first element of O’Brien.  States must still demonstrate that compelling women to become mothers 
is unrelated to suppressing the woman’s expression and that any “incidental” impact on the 
woman’s expression is no greater than necessary to further that interest.  Furthermore, when 
considering these requirements, judges must conduct an independent evaluation and cannot defer 
to any plausible legislative justification and are not free, let alone required, to manufacture one of 
their own. 
 
While supporters of anti-abortion measures may sincerely believe that compelling women to 
become mothers protects the life of the child, the First Amendment demands more than good 
intentions.  While anti-abortion laws protect conception, insulating conception regardless of the 
pregnant woman’s wishes is not equivalent to protecting the health and safety of the child during 
or after pregnancy.  As Justice Brennan noted in a different context, “the State has no legitimate 
general interest in someone’s life, completely abstracted from the interest of the person living that 
life…”194  An extensive body of literature exists examining the relationship between unwanted 
pregnancies and the subsequent effects upon the women and children involved and that literature 
will not be repeated here.195  Instead, this essay summarizes the findings from the TURNAWAY 
STUDY, a ten year study of a thousand women seeking abortions who either had the procedure 
performed or were forced to carry the pregnancy to term.196  In light of this research, the criticisms 
and the reasons offered by the Supreme Court in both Roe and Casey take on new significance 
when considered under the heightened scrutiny required by the First Amendment.197  The 
Constitutional question is not whether laws restricting abortion are effective or wise means of 
achieving the states’ “legitimate interests in the health of the woman and in protecting the potential 
life within her,”198 but whether states can demonstrate that laws restricting abortion further that 
legitimate purpose, and, therefore, are unrelated to the suppression of expression.  If the law 
furthers a legitimate purpose unrelated to expression, the state must then demonstrate that any 
incidental burden on expression is no more than necessary to achieve that interest.  While abortion 
restrictions protect conception, there is no factual support for the proposition that they protect the 
health and safety of the woman, the fetus she carries, or the child that may be born.  Rather, the 
evidence strongly supports the opposite conclusion: denying women access to safe abortions 
exposes women and children to greater harm. 
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As the Supreme Court recognized in Roe, forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to term negatively 
impacts her health and well-being and the health and well-being of the child.199  By its very nature, 
pregnancy impacts the physical and emotional wellbeing of a pregnant woman, and carries with it 
a small, but very real chance that the pregnancy will result in the mother’s death.200  According to 
the Centers for Disease Control, in the United States approximately 700 women die per year 
because of complications related to pregnancy and delivery.201  In 2017, the US recorded 17.3 
deaths for every 100,000 live births.202  Under no other circumstances does the government require 
individuals to risk or sacrifice themselves to save another life.203  Drafting individuals for military 
service is the closest analogy, and the purpose of the draft is to protect the entire public, not to 
serve the interest of one potential life.204   
 
Fortunately, death is a relatively rare outcome, but pregnancy can negatively affect health in other 
ways.  Some women experience high blood pressure; for others high blood pressure damages 
organs including the liver and kidney, and in some cases lead to seizures.205  For some women 
pregnancy results in diabetes which not only has life-long health consequences for them, but 
increases the risk of birth defects, stillbirth, and preterm birth.206  Other women experience 
depression, in some cases severe, both during and after the pregnancy.207  Women are subject to 
deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism where blood clots form and break away to block 
the lungs.208  Some women will experience hemorrhaging/serious bleeding that require medical 
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Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. 
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intervention, in some cases requiring a hysterectomy thus ending her physical ability to have 
children in the future.209 
 
While the preceding risks apply to both wanted and unwanted pregnancies, the Turnaway Study 
documents that women forced to carry a pregnancy to term are more likely to experience negative 
mental and physical health consequences.  With respect to mental health, the Study found that as 
a whole, there were no differences between the two groups with respect to long term mental 
health210 and post-traumatic stress.211  However, women denied an abortion experienced “more 
symptoms of anxiety and stress and lower levels of self-esteem and life satisfaction” in the short 
term.212  The study found that the initial response to receiving an abortion was overwhelmingly 
relief.213  The denial of an abortion led predominantly to feelings of sadness and regret.214 
Moreover, the study found that, as a group, women who had an abortion did not develop increasing 
feelings of regret in the years that followed, but rather experienced a decline in all emotions with 
relief still remaining the most common feeling.215  With respect to regret, the study found that 95% 
of women reported that abortion was the right decision for them, with women who reported high 
community stigma associated with abortion to be the most likely to regret the decision.216  
Correspondingly, while the majority of women denied an abortion initially reported their continued 
desire for the procedure, feelings of regret declined over time, with women who had less family 
support, an easier time making the original decision, or placing the child for adoption being the 
most likely to continue to wish that they had the abortion.217  
 
With respect to physical health, the study found that a woman’s physical health is more likely to 
be harmed by carrying a pregnancy to term than having an abortion.  In fact, “A woman in the 
United States is 14 times more likely to die from carrying a pregnancy to term than from having 
an abortion.”218  Given the impact of pregnancy on a woman’s body, this result should not be 
surprising as the report notes a third of all deliveries involve a Caesarean section, and serious 
complications are associated with one in four births in general. 219  With respect to the women in 
the study, two deaths were reported for women who gave birth while there were no deaths among 
the women who obtained an abortion.220  6.3% of women that carried their pregnancies to term 
reported potentially life threatening conditions compared to 1.1% of women whose abortions were 
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performed just under the gestational limit and .5% of women in the first-trimester.221  Long term, 
women who gave birth were more likely to report poor or fair health and experience high blood 
pressure.222 
 
Both Roe and Casey concluded that states may not limit abortions when the woman’s health and 
life is threatened because doing so would violate her substantive rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   Under the First Amendment, requiring a woman to subject herself to the risks of 
pregnancy itself, let alone a failure to recognize exceptions for the health and safety of the woman, 
undermines the argument that denying women access to abortions serves the purpose of protecting 
her health and safety during pregnancy.  The unfortunate reality is that forcing women to carry a 
pregnancy to term guarantees that some women will die, the health of other women will be 
impaired for life, and still others will lose the ability to become pregnant in the future.   
 
Likewise, restricting abortion does nothing to provide for a healthy pregnancy.  Other than forcing 
the pregnant woman to remain pregnant, these laws do nothing to ensure a healthy pregnancy or a 
healthy birth.  Laws restricting or banning abortions are not contingent upon access to healthcare, 
treatment for substance dependency, mental health services, nutrition, housing, transportation, 
financial assistance, assistance with children for whom she is already responsible, education, or 
job training and placement.  These services are not only relevant to the health of the woman, but 
fundamental to the healthy development of the fetus.  Without any guarantee that a pregnant 
woman will receive the resources necessary for a healthy pregnancy, laws restricting abortion 
guarantee that some pregnancies will result in otherwise avoidable miscarriages, birth defects 
including brain damage, learning and developmental disabilities, and other life-threatening 
conditions.223  Once again, under these circumstances, laws prohibiting abortion only protect 
conception.  While such laws guarantee that pregnancies will continue, they do nothing to ensure 
that compelled pregnancies result in live births or healthy children.  Without more, prohibiting 
abortion only guarantees that some children will be born with lifelong medical and developmental 
challenges, and still others will be born only to experience a painful, brutal, and short existence.224 
 
Lastly, laws restricting abortion do nothing to address the lifelong emotional and economic well-
being of woman or child.   Laws prohibiting abortion force women to confront obstacles that they 
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would not have otherwise faced.225  Overall, the TURNAWAY STUDY found that women denied 
abortions were more likely to experience: 
 
[a]n increase in poverty; a decrease in employment that lasts for years; a scaling back of 
aspirational plans and years spent trying to raise a child without enough money to pay for 
food, housing, and transportation instead of pursuing other life goals.226 
 
Of the women in the study, sixty-one percent of women denied abortions were living below the 
poverty level six months after birth compared to 45% of women who received the abortion.227  
And, over the next four years the women who had given birth were significantly more likely to be 
poor,228 and more likely to be “raising children as single parents with no family support.”229  This 
was not only true for the woman and newborn but for her existing children as well.230  Existing 
children were not only more likely to experience poverty, but also less successful at achieving age 
related developmental milestones such as fine motor skill, expressive language, and social-
emotional.231 With respect to the child born from the unwanted pregnancy, the study found that 
the women were more likely to report less emotional attachment with the child including feelings 
of being trapped,232 and while the mother may subsequently develop a closer relationship this 
initial bonding phase is associated with the child’s long-term psychology and development 
outcomes.233  Moreover, the study found that women denied abortions were more likely to 
experience violence from the father.234  In part, this can be attributed to the fact that having the 
child results in ongoing contact with abusers.235   
 
Some women will decide not to maintain a relationship with the child following the pregnancy.  
Lucky children will be well cared for by relatives or adopted by caring and nurturing families.  
Unfortunately, others will be left to the mercy of underfunded and understaffed state or private 
institutions.  Many of these children will be neglected and abused.236  Without anyone to support 
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them, guide them, or be their champion, they will be unable to form healthy relationships and be 
incapable of caring for themselves.237  The failure of anti-abortion laws to address the actual health 
and safety concerns of  woman and child only reinforces the conclusion that those laws do not 
advance a state’s legitimate interest in the health and safety of woman and child, and, therefore, 
are unconstitutional.  Standing alone, antiabortion laws are not pro-child, pro-woman, or pro-life.  
They are simply anti-abortion.   
 
C. Judicial Review not Activism 
 
Having identified how abortion implicates a woman’s freedom of speech, and why laws restricting 
abortion violate the First Amendment, this part concludes by addressing the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process connection between bakers and pregnant women, and why First 
Amendment analysis reveals the defect of paying lip service to judicial review in both 
circumstances.  If judges must more carefully evaluate whether bakers should be free to deny their 
services to same-sex couples, women should, at the very least, receive the same consideration 
when it comes to bearing children. 
 
In the years, if not months to come, the First Amendment may become the only provision of the 
Constitution that requires, or allows, courts to consider whether laws restricting abortions restrict 
a woman’s freedom no more than necessary to protect health and safety.  Because the Supreme 
Court’s decisions on reproductive freedom are based upon the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court may conclude that like freedom of contract, laws 
interfering with a woman’s decision to carry a pregnancy to term are subject only to rational basis 
review.  Unless courts adopt the standard proposed by Justice Brennan in Fritz238 or something 
similar, laws restricting abortion, if not outlawing abortion, will be upheld under the “any 
plausible” reason standard.  Under this standard, the underlying purpose and its relationship to the 
actual health and safety of mother and child become irrelevant.  Instead, reality is replaced by any 
plausible fiction fabricated by the government.  As discussed in Part II.C., this is judicial 
abdication, not judicial review. 
 
With respect to reproductive freedom, the error of judicial abdication is compounded by the fact 
that it only becomes the standard if the Supreme Court engages in judicial activism.  States will 
only be entitled to this level of deference if the Supreme Court overrules Roe and its progeny.  
While it is certainly true that a Supreme Court decision can be wrong from the day it was decided, 
overturning Roe necessitates rejecting almost fifty years of precedent during which, in the face of 
constant and vocal criticism, Justices appointed by both parties consistently concluded that the 
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the liberty of a woman to decide whether to carry 
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a pregnancy to term.  As Justice O’Connor emphasized in Casey, the only honest explanation for 
rejecting Roe is a surrender to political pressure.239  In other words, if states are given the authority 
to define life as beginning from conception or to exercise the police power under those 
circumstances, regardless of the justification, it will not be because the Court is correcting an error 
in legal reasoning, the bias of previous Justices, or because of changed circumstances; it will be 
the result of a concerted political effort to pack the judiciary with judges who are more committed 
to ending abortion than upholding the rule of law.  To reach their desired outcome, they will not 
follow precedent or rely upon the text of the Constitution which only refers to persons born or the 
longstanding definition of state police power as protecting the interests of the public.  Instead, they 
must overturn precedent and argue that the terms used in the Constitution and understood over 
centuries have been misunderstood and misapplied.  They will then ignore the fact that being 
capable of surviving outside of the womb is the only definition of a person that is not arbitrary.  
Instead, they will adopt the highly disputed proposition that the power of state begins at the 
moment of conception, and, perhaps with some exceptions, is superior to any interest of the 
individuals actually affected.  The Supreme Court must do all of this to give states the authority to 
burden the freedom and lives of individuals to vindicate a theory of life that members of the public 
do not share and do not want imposed upon themselves or others.   After adopting all of these 
disputed theories, Lochner will now be invoked to not only deny courts the authority to review 
legislative decisions, but to impress them in the service of defending those decisions, no matter 
how arbitrary or cruel.  
 
There may someday be a future in which protecting life at conception is not where a state's power 
begins and its obligations end. In this world, protecting fetal life might be a rational and reasonable 
part of a comprehensive system that protects health and promotes the wellbeing of all its citizens, 
not just their conception.  In a world where the government takes sufficient responsibility for the 
lives that it changes, requiring a woman to carry her pregnancy to term may be more than 
symbolism.  The pregnant woman and potential child would be more than living tributes to 
someone else’s definition of life, but would be treated as human beings equally deserving of 
dignity and respect as those who would fundamentally change their lives.  If such a world were to 
exist, prohibiting abortion as a means of protecting the health and safety of citizens would be less 
arbitrary and more reasonable (even if still unconstitutional).   But in the United States in 2021, 
and for the foreseeable future, this is nothing more than fantasy.  Unfortunately, if courts must 
defend rather than evaluate whether a law is consistent with the freedom guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution, then a fantasy will be all they need to ignore the reality that denying woman access 
to safe abortions only serves to vindicate the moral and religious beliefs of abortion opponents by 
imposing lifelong harm and hardship on women and children.  
 
IV. Conclusion: A right by any other name … 
                                                
239 Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (“So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to 
reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.”). 




“The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right names.”  - Confucius.   
 
Following the lead of the current Justices of the Supreme Court, this essay evaluated the reasons 
for renaming freedom of contract and reproductive freedom, freedom of “speech,” and what 
wisdom it might provide.  We learned that expression is sufficiently elastic to justify a closer 
analysis of the claims of bakers and mothers.  Moreover, understanding that expression is 
implicated becomes a legitimate means of obtaining some semblance of judicial review.  While 
heightened review may not change the result, nor should it necessarily, it plays an important role 
in ensuring that the principles of the Constitution, including the principle of judicial review are 
upheld.  If this is true for contracts, it is also true for abortion.   Appreciating the symbolism and 
messages involved in carrying a pregnancy to term, the essay demonstrated that laws prohibiting 
abortion hijack women and children to serve as testament to the proposition that the unborn are 
more important than the living, and demonstrate that beliefs of those opposed to abortion are more 
important than the pain and suffering they inflict upon strangers. Unless courts are permitted or 
even forced to explain how such a state of affairs is consistent with the justice and liberty 
guaranteed by the Constitution, they will be unable to hide the evidence that forcing women to 
carry a pregnancy to term imposes significant harm upon mother and child alike.  All of this was 
made possible by considering whether old problems should be given new names. 
 
However, the story of bakers and mothers is as much about the freedom to determine when and 
how we share our lives as it is about the messages we share.  The baker’s real objection is not 
being compelled to voice his support for same-sex marriage -- that was not what the law required; 
the baker is objecting to being forced to do business with a same-sex couple getting married.  
Likewise, while privacy laws may limit the information a party would like to use for expression 
based upon what information represents, the primary purpose of privacy protection is to provide 
individuals with some agency over when they will become the subject of surveillance.  Likewise, 
the pro-life movement behind efforts to restrict or outlaw abortion unquestionably wants to send 
the message that life begins at conception and should be celebrated.  But abortion is also a 
disagreement over whether the pregnant woman is free to determine when, if ever, she will create 
the most fundamental and intimate of associations and become a mother to a child.  While these 
cases have traditionally been considered under substantive due process, or as explored above, 
under freedom of speech, the individual nature of those freedoms tends to overshadow the fact that 
the decisions and consequences take place in relationships, not in isolation.240    
                                                
240 A full discussion of this topic is far beyond the scope of this essay, but in short, I believe that the power 
of the government to regulate relationships is directly related to the consensual nature of the relationship, 
how open those associations are to strangers, and the power they exercise or seek to exercise over those 
outside of the association, and is predicated on the government’s authority to protect individual and group 
autonomy from private as well as public power.  Seana Shiffren and Lawrence Tribe have already sketched 
more comprehensive theories of freedom of association beyond freedom of expression.  See Shiffrin, supra 
note 169 at 867-869 (grounding associational freedom in liberalism and the value of cooperative activity); 
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While a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy clearly involves “her body, her choice,” 
protection of individual and personal autonomy is only part of the story, and on its own allows 
opponents to describe abortion as selfish and anti-family.  Framing the pregnant woman’s liberty 
interest as the freedom to determine “what’s best for me” does not capture or reflect the actual 
reasons women seek abortions which have more to do with the relationships that will be created 
or altered by a pregnancy.  In the Turnaway Study, researchers found that the women in the study 
overwhelmingly sought an abortion because they believed it was best for their existing children 
and the potential child.241  The women did not choose abortions flippantly or callously to have 
more time to party for example, they chose abortion because they believed that they would not be 
able to provide the resources and environment to safely raise a healthy child, or be ready for the 
physical, mental, and emotional demands of good parenting.242  Women were also concerned about 
whether they would be raising the child on their own as poor relationships with men was cited as 
a major reason for seeking an abortion as the relationships were already too fragile, toxic, or 
abusive.243  Unsurprisingly and unfortunately, as discussed in Part III.B, the women denied 
abortions accurately predicted the hardships they and their children would face, and the study ends 
with a plea to trust women. 
 
Ultimately, it should not matter whether a woman’s freedom is labeled as privacy, speech, or 
association.  While the Constitution names certain freedoms, it protects liberty in general and 
expressly rejects the proposition that only named freedoms are guaranteed.244  Names only matter 
because members of the Supreme Court use them to change the nature of judicial review.  While 
this approach may be useful shorthand, the Justices also use the labels they create to hide when 
they are not defining the liberty of all, but rather mandating their own moral code.  Even more 
troubling is the fact that when Judges share the same moral code as legislators, they use names as 
a justification to defend laws enacted based upon those shared beliefs even when they are arbitrary 
or “sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”245  With 
respect to a woman’s freedom to determine whether to carry a pregnancy to term, we should not 
be distracted by efforts to name the freedom or worry about what doctrinal box it should be 
assigned to.  The only constitutional issue is whether the government can force a woman to become 
a mother when she believes, quite accurately, that it will be to the detriment of both her AND the 
                                                
see Tribe, supra note 169 at 1941 (grounding associational freedom in Kantian terms).  For more 
“traditional” analysis of freedom of association see Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and 
Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 
YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L. J. 978 (2011). 
241 TURNAWAY, supra note 193 at 35-42. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 U.S. Const. Amend. 9 (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”) 
245 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288, 307 (1964). 
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child, and when those that would impose their judgment upon those women do so without taking 
any responsibility for the consequences of their actions.   
 
 
